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Abstract 
 
This article analyses risk, value and responsibility in a high wire cycling stunt which 
took place in Brooklyn in 1897. The stunt involved the performer’s bicycle completing 
an electrical circuit to illuminate his body and wheels with coloured lights, using 
electricity siphoned from a nearby Brooklyn trolley route. I explore the connections 
and distinctions between stunts and circus, and the status of risk and responsibility in 
each. I then analyse what is known about the contract between the performer and the 
railroad company, and the types of exchange it involved. I compare these modes of 
exchange and investment to Randy Martin’s concept of a ‘derivative’, which 
encompasses a mode of sociality as well as a type of financial investment. Martin 
argued for conjoint critiques of performance and value abstractions, holding that the 
‘intricate acrobatics of high finance have all manner of parallel expression in dances on 
the ground’. Pursuing this parallel between bodily movement and value abstraction, I 
read this bicycle act, and stunts more broadly, as embodied derivatives. 
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Luminous Connections: Risk, Value and Responsibility  
In A Late Nineteenth-Century High Wire Bicycle Stunt 
 
Live Wire 
 
In the mid-1890s, train lines in Brooklyn were changed from being powered by steam 
to being powered by electricity.1 An aerial performer took advantage of this new 
amenity in his high wire act in Ridgwood Park, Queens County, in 1897. Performing 
under the alias ‘Professor Arion’, Frank McDonald or Frank Donahue or D. H. 
McDonnell (sources disagree as to his name) cycled across a wire between 60 and 75 
feet from the ground, before an audience of two or three thousand.2 The name ‘Arion’ is 
taken from a winged horse in Greek mythology, paralleling the hybridity of the 
man/bicycle in the air, and echoing an affinity between flight and aerial acts common in 
circus practice and discourses.3 
 
Drawing electricity from the nearby train lines, ‘Arion’ connected to the live wire via 
his bicycle wheels, which were made of grooved metal. The New York Tribune 
described:  
 
When ‘Arion’ mounted the wire from a small platform built around the top 
of the pole, all eyes were upon him. Small incandescent lights were so 
arranged about his clothing and the wheel that they illuminated as soon as 
the electrical current was touched. ‘Arion’ was to ride 100 yards.4 
 
McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell was apparently an experienced dare-devil performer, 
who had attracted some attention by walking a narrow plank over Niagara Falls a few 
years before. Twenty-eight years old, he lived in Fort Wayne, Indiana, and had a wife 
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and small child.5 Having recently performed his bicycle act near a railway line in 
San Francisco, McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell had been engaged by the Brooklyn 
Heights Railroad Company for a seven-night run, and had completed the act 
successfully the night before this performance.6 
 
Exactly who was responsible for the show was a matter of intense debate in the 
aftermath, because it went badly wrong. The Tribune details: 
 
He had gone about a quarter of the distance when he was seen to topple off 
the wheel, and both man and bicycle fell to the ground. … A call was sent 
to St. Catherine’s Hospital, Brooklyn, but he was dead before it was 
responded to.7 
 
The Brooklyn Daily Eagle published the results of an autopsy, which concluded 
that McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell had died of electric shock, suggesting that the 
voltage was higher than intended.8 The Brooklyn Heights Company argued, 
however, that it was mechanically impossible for the charge to be higher than 550 
Volts. Nonetheless, the Eagle accused both the Company and the manager of the 
park of negligence, because there had been no net under the wire.9 Under the New 
York Penal Code, proprietors were obliged to provide a net for acrobatic 
exhibitions (an example of increasingly protective and proscriptive performance 
legislation). The Company blamed the manager of the park, claiming that he had 
employed McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell; meanwhile, the manager of the park 
blamed the Company, claiming that the only existing contract was between it and 
the performer.10 In response to questioning from an Eagle reporter, the Company 
stated that in the contract, McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell had: 
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‘formally released the company from any damage or injury arising out of the 
performance. All the railroad company agreed to do was to put up the wires 
and furnish a current of 500 volts. Prof. Arion was to do all the rest and to 
take upon himself the sole responsibility. … [T]he railroad company had 
nothing to do with last night’s fatal performance.’11 
 
The spokesman went on to say that the performer had come ‘highly recommended’ by 
managers of railroad companies in the West. McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell was 
effectively blamed in this account for his failure to overcome the risk as promised, 
while the Company was presented as the provider of ‘opportunity’.12 The statement 
referred to McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell as ‘Prof. Arion’ throughout, in spite of the 
general passenger agent having eaten dinner with him a couple of nights before. This 
textual slip suggests that the Company had taken at face value — or wished to 
imply that it had — the ‘fictional’ aspect of what Thomas Postlewait terms the 
‘double identity of a performance event’, thereby eliding the material conditions of 
the event.13 The artist’s fictional capacity to overcome the risk of his precarious 
act entirely had shaped the act’s material organisation. 
 
In the introduction to a special issue of The Drama Review on precarity in 2012, 
Nicholas Ridout and Rebecca Schneider invoked precarity as a state of performing 
bodies and a condition of life and work. As well as an act which teeters on an edge, 
precarity expresses the conditions of its creation: a pervasive state of uncertainty. In 
such circumstances, precarity holds out a ‘kind of promise’ which reaches towards 
innovation and creativity, and intertwines them with risk. Physical stunts such as this 
one are paradigmatic acts of precarity: ‘embodied balancing act[s]’, which situate 
opportunity on a borderline between life and death.14  
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The Company seemed to take seriously McDonald’s undertaking: that precarity 
could be invited, yet at the same time entirely negated, through the skill of an 
individual body. 
 
This article focuses on a nexus of risk, value and responsibility in this bicycle stunt. I 
explore the connections and distinctions between stunts and circus, and the status of 
risk and responsibility in each. I then analyse what is known about the contract between 
McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell and the Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company, and the 
types of exchange and investment it involved. Finally, I compare these modes of 
exchange and investment to dance scholar Randy Martin’s concept of a ‘derivative’, 
which encompasses a mode of sociality as well as a type of financial investment that 
gained prominence in late nineteenth-century stock markets. Martin outlined his 
concept in relation to dance and present-day precarity in ‘A Precarious Dance, A 
Derivative Sociality’, arguing that the ‘dynamics of the derivative can be seen across all 
manner of human activity in ways that engender mutual indebtedness’.15 Martin argued 
for conjoint critiques of performance and value abstractions, holding that dance is ‘a 
key site in which bodies in movement make value’ and that the ‘intricate acrobatics of 
high finance have all manner of parallel expression in dances on the ground’.16 
Pursuing this parallel between bodily movement and value abstraction, I put both 
Martin’s derivative and Karl Marx’s concept of ‘fictitious capital’ into critical dialogue 
with the material conditions and aesthetics of McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell’s bicycle 
act.17 
 
Stunts and Circus 
 
High wire bicycle or velocipede acts had been a popular feature of circuses and 
carnivals in the United States for the previous two decades. Peta Tait cautions against 
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stories of ‘aerial firsts’; in the 1890s, however, St Paul Daily Globe believed that 
aeronauts Harry Gilbert and ‘Prof. Donaldson’, who had run Buffalo Bill’s advertising 
hot air balloons, were responsible for the first high wire cycling exhibition in the 
country.18 In the early 1880s, French aerialist Ella Zuilla (sometimes called Zuila or 
Zola), the ‘female Blondin’, toured a high-wire velocipede act with Adam Forepaugh’s 
circus.19 For the next two decades, female and male high wire bicycle acts performed 
widely, including Alferetta Adair, ‘Davenport’, ‘Herbo’, duo George Zurella and Emma 
Dubois, and troupes such as the Melrosas, the Charest Family, Geo. Scott and Family, 
Professor Baum and his troupe, the Forepaugh family, and several companies from 
Tokyo.20  
 
McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell’s addition of electricity was highly novel, and 
indicative of nineteenth-century circus’s function, in Matthew Wittman’s words, as a 
‘forum for new technologies’.21 Helen Stoddart describes circus’s relationship with 
electricity as constitutive of its historical alignment with the ‘spirit of modernity’ and 
technological innovation, pointing out that the first public display of arc electric 
lighting took place in a light parade and the illuminated ring of Howe’s London Circus, 
Sanger’s Royal Menagerie and Cooper, Bailey and Company’s International Allied 
Shows on 15 April 1879.22 Subsequently, electric lighting was widely adopted and 
puffed in circus advertisements: in 1883, John Robinson’s Big Show was ‘Made as 
bright as the noon-day sun by the $30,000 Brush Electric Light!’23 In a dynamic 
intrinsic to circus performance, McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell’s bicycle act brought 
fascination with electrical spectacle to bear on a single body. It staged the incorporation 
of the performer into an electrical circuit, exemplifying Stoddart’s view of circus’s 
tendency to ‘dramatise the frenetic, dangerous, spectacular and shocking energies of a 
modern secular world’ in a manner which (when successful) enacted the potential of 
human bodies to be ‘enriched by such encounters’.24 A similar electrified act appeared 
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in 1900 in Atlantic, Iowa, where ‘Davenport’ provided a ‘magnificent illuminated 
display at night, riding a bicycle on a high wire’.25 
 
Electrical novelty is one of several ways in which McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell’s act 
can be read as a one-man embodiment of turn-of-the-century American circus. The 
performance took place at the height of large-scale railroad circus; that year, Janet M. 
Davis writes, each major circus was transported by scores of railcars carrying as many 
as a thousand labourers and performers, human and animal.26 Such colossal scale was 
enabled by the development of the railway network itself, which had standardised and 
rationalised, becoming a ‘powerful cultural icon of a new modern nation-state’.27  
McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell’s act was an off-shoot of the railway network, 
siphoning its power and using its architectural structures for a stage. Indeed, his stunt 
assembled the parts of a railway in a stripped back or metonymic form: it put wheels on 
a rail and electrified them. 
 
I have termed this high wire performance a ‘stunt’, adopting a word which was coming 
into common use in New York slang at this time. Stunts are frequently referred to in 
circus scholarship to convey both dangerous, skilful acts and attention-grabbing 
promotional mechanisms.28 Efforts to define ‘circus’ intertwine with those aimed at 
defining ‘stunts’ to the extent that stunts could be understood as simply a subset or 
specific instance of circus. Both are concerned with bodies in danger, and feature 
virtuosic physical skill. Both have traditionally been considered ‘low’, commercial art 
forms (if they are termed art at all) and tend to share a sense of absurdity and frivolity. 
Both bring simultaneous and conflicting connotations of authentic danger and illusion 
or trickery.29  
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Stunts and circus also have a common and intimate affinity with advertisement. 
Stoddart argues that advertising is part of circus’s ‘art as well as its machinery’.30 Most 
obviously, Stoddart means that circus posters had substantive aesthetic qualities. More 
broadly, she emphasises the mutually reliant development of circus and advertising 
practices, citing ‘stunts’ and ‘public relations exercises’ as circus’s key advertising 
forms (along with print).31 Live performances were a crucial aspect of the blossoming 
advertising industry in New York and other American urban centres in the late 
nineteenth century.32 Where the performing arts were concerned, in vaudeville, for 
example, live advertising sometimes made the act advertised and the 
advertisement difficult to separate. Though performers and critics referred to 
their stage acts as stunts, Edward Renton’s early twentieth century manual for 
theatre managers listed vaudeville performers who were willing to do their acts 
not only on stage but also as ‘special stunts’ in other public places, diving from 
bridges or balancing on high corners of buildings.33 The term ‘stunt’ is marked by 
its ability to express both the act and the selling machine. 
 
While close affinities between circus and stunts exist, stunts are also distinct from 
circus. Historically, the term ‘stunt’ in the sense of feat only came into use at the end of 
the nineteenth century and it was not particularly associated with circus acts.34 Though 
‘stunt’ could be used to describe a handstand, it also conveyed sensational journalism, 
political campaigns, and acts in everyday life.35 While danger and skill are at the core of 
circus, the skill and danger of a late nineteenth-century stunt performance existed 
primarily to attract attention, a role that might also be fulfilled by other forms of 
sensation or controversy. 
 
McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell’s bicycle performance, then, was a circus-style act 
in that it embodied absurdity and sensation and was ‘a vehicle for the 
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demonstration and taunting of danger’.36 It was also a ‘stunt’ as distinct from circus, 
because these qualities were put into service not only for the sake of excitement and 
entertainment, but also for the promotion of another, unconnected entity. The 
significance and function of McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell’s endangered body was 
altered, because it was put at risk to increase the value of an unrelated organisation, the 
Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company. To employ Martin’s terms, the act entangled 
performer and Company in a contested state of mutual indebtedness. 
 
The Company had organised ‘Arion’s’ performance as part of its Hessian Volkfest 
celebrations, a public access event which served as a form of promotion for the 
Company. Such events were part of a new drive among railroad companies to entertain 
and attract potential customers: the Street Railway Journal reported that managers who 
were ‘awake to the interests of their roads’ were ‘anxious to keep novelties before the 
riding public’.37 It was common for railroad operators to manage or lease adjoining 
parks, and their individually-owned electrical power plants presented new opportunities 
for engaging the public: the Railway Journal weighed up the pros and cons of installing 
an electric fountain for entertainment. McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell’s aerial 
performance highlighted the Company’s new technological feature. Both performer and 
Company traded on the novelty of their electrical connections, spectacularised by 
McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell’s body at risk. 
 
Such leveraging made use of, and also altered, the invocation of responsibility in circus 
acts. Stoddart describes this as the ‘expansion and contraction’ of circus’s performance 
‘frame’ through endangerment of performers, whereby audience members recognise 
and feel some responsibility for the artists’ ‘proximity to human extinction, rather than 
merely untruth’ (as might be the case in realist theatre). The experience of watching 
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circus, Stoddart suggests, makes a distinct claim on a spectator’s sense of 
responsibility.38  
 
Removed from the ring and instrumentalised as advertisement in the late nineteenth 
century, circus stunts retained their capacity to invoke responsibility, and by the 
extremity of the exploitation frequently on display, pushed to the fore conflicts 
concerning freedom and safety. Hence dangerous promotional acts took on a particular 
social resonance; a capacity to reveal a general state of precarity and mutual 
indebtedness, and raise widely applicable questions about whether and how lives ought 
to be protected.   
 
Because of stunts’ association with several performing arts (circus, vaudeville, film) 
and other cultural performance forms (advertisement, political campaigns, sport), the 
risks attendant on them tend to be more conceptually unwieldy than those associated 
with a circus act undertaken within a circus frame. This is not to suggest that one is 
more dangerous than the other, but rather that it is not always clear what framework 
should be brought to bear on stunt performances, and this ambiguity complicates how 
risk signifies and what social function it serves. Writing on female stunt pilots, Mary 
Russo celebrated stunts’ potential to celebrate autonomy and empower marginalised 
actors, and at the same time warned of stunts’ capacity to mark those who undertook 
them as inherently risky. Russo described a stunt as ‘a tactic for groups or individuals in 
a certain risky situation in which a strategy is not possible’ (drawing on Michel de 
Certeau’s theorisation of everyday life). Note that as in Ridout and Schneider’s 
definition of precarity, risk here becomes a condition of production as well as a quality 
of the act produced. While embracing stunts’ capacity to celebrate freedom, Russo also 
warned that through stunts, performers could come to embody riskiness, exacerbating 
the sense that they were in themselves always and already risky. Russo framed this as 
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stunts’ tendency to ‘perpetuate the blaming, stigmatization, and marginalizing of groups 
and persons’.39 Springing from a condition of precarity, stunts could justify and further 
that condition.  
 
I’ll now to turn to how the contract between McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell and the 
Company structured their exchange and mutual indebtedness. 
 
 
Contracts: A Romance of the Market 
 
The contract between ‘Prof. Arion’ and the Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company 
involved two types of exchange, which accorded McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell two 
different roles.  
 
On the one hand, McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell was a labourer. He earned a wage for 
his work and was directly employed by the Company, in spite of the spokesman’s 
efforts to depict the act as benefiting nobody but the performer. If we read this in terms 
of Karl Marx’s conception of industrial production, McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell’s 
abstract labour was bought by the Company for a wage, and his surplus labour was the 
source of the surplus value the act created.40 The aim of the Company was to increase 
its value through the act. 
 
On the other hand, McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell was given an ‘opportunity’ to 
increase his own value as a performing artist. Opportunity — precarity’s promise — 
implies money, but while money is ‘pure quantity’, opportunity approaches 
immeasurability.41 An opportunity might give rise to more opportunity, becoming an 
ongoing condition which perpetually renews itself. In that sense, both the Company and 
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McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell offered something that approached immeasurability in 
the contract. In this capacity, McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell performed the function 
of ‘commodity capital’ in Marx’s schema; he was one of the commodities which came 
out with increased value at the end of the production process.42  
 
Such ability to secure fees for further work in the future has been termed ‘human 
capital’, a concept developed by the ‘Chicago School’ of neoliberal economists, 
particularly Gary Becker, in the 1950s and ’60s. In Michel Foucault’s The Birth of 
Biopolitics, a series of lectures given at the College de France in 1978 and 1979, 
Foucault framed ‘human capital’ as a progression of biopolitical governance and an 
example of the ‘grid’ of economic thinking expanding to cover all aspects of human 
life.43 In this model, the wage labourer is not dependent on a company to facilitate their 
work. Instead, they are the entrepreneurs of themselves, with full responsibility for the 
investment of their own capital (in spite of their not owning the means of production). 
There is a broad historical parallel between the developments Foucault describes — the 
neo-liberal, late capitalist structures that increasingly took hold in the second half of the 
twentieth century — and the liberal political and economic ideology of the late 
nineteenth century. In both cultures, the entrepreneur becomes an ideal model of self-
sufficient growth. 
 
The Company’s reaction to McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell’s death demonstrated its 
interest in emphasising its role as provider of opportunity (or means of production), and 
restricting both responsibility and impact to McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell as an 
individual. Clearly, this avoided the social questions in play, such as, what 
responsibilities did a company have towards its employees? What role did government 
and the law have in this relationship? 
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Instead of instating a condition of mutual reliance, the contract created an ideal, self-
reliant subject. Writing on turn-of-the-century consumer culture, Mark Seltzer argues 
that the ‘self-made character of the commercial person’ in liberal culture is an 
embodiment of the ‘contract, and the forms of possession and self-possession, it 
entails’.44 Interestingly, for McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell, his ‘self-possession’ 
seems to have been enacted under the name of his persona, Professor Arion. He 
‘possessed’ himself as someone else, as a character. This is an absurd extension of the 
condition of having a ‘character’ in market culture, in the sense of creating a person 
who is able to make good on promises. Seltzer argues that neither the contract nor the 
notion of the market register the emerging conditions of identity at the turn of the 
century, which Seltzer frames as involving intimate couplings of bodies and machines 
and the simultaneous reduction of individuals to sheer materiality and total 
abstraction.45 Seltzer holds that the anachronistic subjectivity that contracts promised 
may be precisely why they exerted a particular fascination at this historical moment.46  
 
Such fascination stems, in Seltzer’s view, from tension between two rival models of the 
individual in turn-of-the-century American consumer society: ‘the model of competitive 
individualism, on the one side, and disciplinary individualism, on the other’. Seltzer 
characterizes these models as ‘market culture’ and ‘machine culture’ and is particularly 
interested in what he terms the ‘romance of the market in machine culture’ and the 
ways in which that romance became ‘functional’ in consumer society.47 The ‘romance 
of the market’ constructed an ideal free subject, solely responsible for themselves and 
their investments. Within emerging monopoly capitalism, then, an idealised concept of 
market individualism became productive, precisely because of the frisson it created 
with emerging machine culture. At a point in which interconnection was increasingly 
systematised, individual feats, responsibilities and freedoms become particularly 
attractive and operable, not as a point of opposition, but rather as a complementary 
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fantasy. 
 
Circus epitomised such friction between market and machine culture: circus owners, 
Davis argues, were major exponents of entrepreneurialism and the ‘ideal of the self-
made man’, yet circus companies were exemplary of the disciplinarian, strictly time-
managed work cultures which would come to be associated with Frederick Taylor and 
Henry Ford.48 The development of industrial trusts and monopolies which took hold in 
late nineteenth-century United States was mirrored by ‘combination’ circuses.49 
Circus presented an ‘intimate look at the logistics and ideology of the new industrial 
order’, Davis writes, yet at the same time evoked a ‘pre-industrial world’ where humans 
and animals could still outstrip machines.50  
 
As well as risk to his life, a key source of drama in ‘Arion’s’ act was tension between a 
spectacle of human self-reliance, and a spectacle of incorporation into disciplined 
systems. As a risky solo, the feat spoke to a glorious autonomy, beautified by precarity, 
but it was also embedded in and enabled by the infrastructure of the city, with its 
attendant ties to society, government and business. Because its novelty lay in 
connections, the act threw into relief the systems that brought it into being, and 
‘Arion’s’ place within them:  
 
[H]e started over the wire, making connections, so that his clothing and 
bicycle, which were decorated with incandescent lamps of various colors, 
blazed with great brilliancy. As McDonnell glided out on the wire his body 
was thrown into strong relief by the blaze from the wheel ….51 
 
Pulled between ideal individualism, on the one hand, and on the other, fascination with 
the increasingly interconnected material cultures of urban modernity, the act invoked a 
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form of metropolitan incandescence, a literal and figurative radiance, which derived 
from the system, but was transferred to the person poised within it. 
 
Electric Sacrifice 
 
The thrill of McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell’s performance drew on his audience’s 
understanding of electrical high wires as both a wonder and a public danger; their 
liveness and deadliness. Disputes about responsibility for safety were manifold in the 
developing electrical network. Live overhead wires had caused accidents and deaths in 
Brooklyn and New York since the early 1880s. Though legislation prescribed the burial 
of electrical wires, disagreements about who should pay meant that in 1897 many wires 
still hung overhead.52 Electricity’s deadliness had been underlined when, after a series 
of experiments on animals (sometimes before a live audience), alternating current was 
adopted as New York’s means of instituting the death penalty in 1889.53 Thomas 
Edison and other direct current advocates had been a major influence on this decision, 
causing some commentators to decry the fact that the deadly workings of the state had 
been hijacked for the purpose of ‘business advertisement’, becoming a state-sponsored 
spectacle which served the established electrical industry.54  
 
In spite of the danger they posed, high wires also provoked wonderment at connectivity. 
Seltzer describes turn-of-the-century amazement at the sense of the ‘pure present 
conveyed by the electric technology’s ‘magical’ and lightning transgression of the 
barriers of time and distance’.55 In an official history of the New York Stock Exchange 
published in 1905, for example, Edmund Stedman recorded an impression of an English 
visitor eighteen years previously (in 1882):   
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[H]e saw a sight that instantly gave him a realization of the extent of our 
peopled territory, and of the meaning of the Stock Exchange as the focus to 
which all currents of American purpose and energy converge. It was shortly 
before the time when the wires of New York’s electric system were buried, 
by enactment, out of sight. Through the air, over New Street, hundreds, 
seemingly thousands, of these wires stretched toward the Exchange. No bird 
could fly through their network, a man could almost walk upon them ….56   
  
Not yet concealed underground, the electric wires made the vast connectivity of the 
Stock Exchange explicit and awe-inspiring; Stedman held it up as evidence of the 
arrival of ‘modern high finance’.57 The Exchange’s electric wires were a vision of 
unceasing circulation of information, money and commodities. Stedman’s description 
invites a conflation of the ‘currents’ of human energy, electrical currents and the 
circulation of currency, or capital. Paradoxically, the mass of entangled wires presented 
in sensual, tangible form the ethereal quality of both electricity and capital. Electricity 
was a commodity that appeared to transcend its status as commodity, akin to money. 
Like paper currency or credit in Marx’s schema in Capital, electrical currents invoked a 
dematerialized medium of circulation, a movement both instantaneous and constant.58 
Rather than displaying itself, electricity had the effect of illuminating commodities 
around it and facilitating their interconnections and exchange.  
 
McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell’s performance spectacularised the bicycle’s turning 
wheels, and its most thrilling element was the completion of an electric circuit, such 
that the performer’s body mingled with, and was subsumed into, that circuit. It was an 
enactment and celebration of circulation, shadowed by the fatal circulation of electricity 
through human bodies in the form of execution.  
 
 17 
The act was also concerned with putting McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell into 
circulation and abstracting him into a commodity, suggestive of Seltzer’s conditions of 
identity in machine culture. On such abstraction of self, Martin wrote: ‘What we call 
identity is certainly an attribute of self that gets bundled, valued, and circulated beyond 
an individual person’.59 Martin situates this tendency to stratify and value identity in the 
dynamics of the derivative. The term derivative has multiple applications in 
McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell’s performance and its context, and is more broadly a 
useful analogy for conceptualising stunts and value. 
 
Stunts and Derivatives 
 
In its broadest sense, derivative refers ‘to the transmission of some characteristic from 
an originating source to a consequent site, expression, or manifestation’, as in the verb, 
to derive.60 A derivative is also a specific financial mechanism, one which developed 
intensely in the final decades of the nineteenth century. In the 1880s (as in the present) 
derivatives were called ‘futures’ and they were the subject of debate and legislation. 
Purchasing a ‘future’ meant buying an option to buy a product or stock at a fixed price, 
at a fixed date in the future. Effectively this was a gamble on the price rising or falling, 
and it massively expanded trade in stock exchanges: ‘The number of those who devote 
their whole time and energies to transactions, which are nothing but bets on the future 
prices of commodities, has become enormous,’ a financial journalist reported in 1883.61 
By the mid 1880s, futures were the ‘main business transacted at the exchanges’.62 
Derivative investments are generally framed as means of offsetting a risk involved in a 
specific investment, which many argue has an overall, societal effect of increasing risk. 
Martin writes that a derivative ‘both particularizes certain risks and generalizes a 
condition of risk’, both ‘anticipate[s] and encourage[s] volatility’.63 Derivatives are 
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concerned with expanding the possibilities of circulation — creating an entirely new, 
related and dependent orbit in which circulation can take place. 
 
Derivatives also consist of yoking together two unrelated functions, and making one 
dependent on the other, enabling unexpected leveraging and extraction of value.  
 
In banking journals, the development of futures was greeted with suspicion and strong 
efforts to distinguish between gambling contracts, which were legally void, and 
contracts made for the ‘actual delivery of merchandise’.64 Writers in banking magazines 
called futures transactions ‘fictitious’ and ‘unproductive’.65 They served only to ‘make 
uncertainty still more uncertain’, to cause ‘defalcation, breach of trust, or unexpected 
insolvency’.66 One 1882 columnist reflected: ‘it is evident that by thus increasing the 
hazard of business, life is made less joyful, the strain is increased, the life-threads are 
sooner snapped.’67 It was widely understood that derivatives stood to make living more 
precarious; this commentator argued against them on the grounds of protecting life and 
happiness. Yet proponents of these ‘quicker and less unelastic trade systems’ argued 
that a pragmatic trader could hardly afford to ignore them.68 
 
Marx would situate derivative investments in the realm of fictitious capital, in which he 
placed all stocks and bonds. Stocks derived their value from actual capital, but became 
free-floating, circulating commodities with prices calculated according to anticipated 
income. Derivatives are like other securities, but further distanced from production. 
This extra layer of abstraction caused anxiety about the growth of derivatives trading in 
the 1880s. If we accept Marx’s understanding of stock exchange commodities, 
derivatives were not intrinsically distinct from any other stock or bond. Their 
heightened abstraction simply brought to the fore the abstraction already taking place in 
the trading of fictitious capital. Derivatives did however weave together unrelated 
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entities, spreading risk in unexpected ways. 
 
I contend there is an analogy between the type of abstraction that took place in 
McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell’s stunt and that which took place in stock exchange 
trading, particularly derivatives. First, in a material sense, 
McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell’s stunt derived from the already active circuit of the 
railroad lines, siphoning power from its wires to create further, dependent circuits.  
 
Second, ‘Prof. Arion’ was a commodified identity derived from 
McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell’s actual one. In a twist on Marx’s term for stocks and 
securities, McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell could be described as embodying fictitious 
capital: Professor Arion. He was, of course, a real person with a real life to lose, yet he 
invested himself as his persona, and the Company held his persona to account. The ‘real 
capital’ and real person of McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell were doubled by an identity 
that derived from him, but was held apart — a persona that facilitated circulation. Marx 
writes that with the development of the credit system, ‘all capital seems to be 
duplicated, and at some points triplicated, by the various way in which the same capital, 
or even the same claim, appears in various hands in different guises’.69 I suggest that 
McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell imitated this process through his construction of 
self and enactment of circulation.  
 
Third, the performer’s body and life were yoked to the value of the Brooklyn Heights 
Railroad Company, in spite of a lack of any material connection between the two. This 
enabled the Company to benefit from the risk the performer bore, paralleling Martin’s 
characterisation of derivatives as ‘quick shifts in deployment of capital to leverage 
money-making effects’.70 Such yoking together of unrelated entities was designed to 
capitalise on the affective economy of physical risk. 
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Finally, the overt riskiness of McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell’s performance made it 
seem as if it was an exceptional instance, set apart from everyday production and 
exchange. Like a derivative, the stunt seemed to be nothing more than circulation for 
circulation’s sake, a form of excess, which ought to be removed from the system. Yet, if 
we accept Marx’s proposition, it actually enacted the abstraction already taking place in 
financial systems, tapping into a much wider condition of risk inherent in the structure 
of commercial enterprises, including the Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company itself. 
 
The Company was undergoing a typical trajectory in terms of financial development, 
indicative of emerging monopoly capitalism. It was incorporated by the Brooklyn 
Rapid Transit Company (apparently before the date of the performance, though this is 
not clear from available sources), which took over all but one of the Brooklyn trolley 
lines by 1900.71 J. P. Morgan himself financed this consolidation as part of his drive to 
organise the nation’s railroads.72  
 
The Brooklyn Rapid Transit Company was also typical of increased public participation 
in the stock exchange, a characteristic of modern high finance. Historian of the New 
York Stock Exchange, Stedman, reported that the Brooklyn railway was a ‘chief public 
fancy’ in the final years of the century, culminating in colossal growth during which the 
‘glowing future of this trolley road’ could not be overstated.73 This gave the Company 
an interest in promoting itself to two overlapping publics — commuters and potential 
investors — connecting increasing numbers of people to its success or failure. 
 
Immediately afterwards, Stedman explained, came the ‘inevitable descent toward the 
level of intrinsic worth, ruining many of its too zealous friends as it fell’.74 Note 
Stedman’s discourse of heights and falls; resistance to, and inevitability of, gravity; and 
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the alignment of gravity with a natural order of value. The market’s veridiction was 
pitted against the public’s credulity, Stedman suggested, and those who took on too 
much risk were ruined as a result. In Stedman’s logic, such falls were not only 
inevitable but also necessary in the eternal pursuit of real or ‘intrinsic’ value. For the 
market to function, some credulous individuals had to be the ‘fall guys’, who at 
once demonstrated the precarious interconnections of the Stock Exchange and 
took the blame upon themselves, momentarily releasing everybody else from 
interconnection by demonstrating their individual lack of skill and judgment.75 
The fall guy’s fall instilled a sense of equilibrium, masking systemic precarity. 
 
The Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company’s distribution of blame following the failed 
high wire cycling act was a literalisation of Stedman’s market logic. In spite of the 
Company organising the performance and standing to benefit from its successful 
completion, in the event of an accident, McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell merely 
demonstrated his own excessive tendencies and failure to live up to ‘Prof. Arion’s’ 
contracted promise. In Seltzer’s terms, the accident presented a macabre romance of 
the market in machine culture. 
 
Both Stedman and Marx imply that fall guys had a capacity to reveal what was ‘real’ 
and what was not. For Stedman this meant restoring ‘real’ value rather than the inflated 
prices brought about by an excitable public and reckless investors. Marx’s position 
might be seen as superficially similar to this, but Marx would have taken the critique 
much further: such speculative ‘excess’ was the financial system revolving confusedly 
about itself, because it was systemically derived from — yet adrift from — production 
and ‘real’ capital. Rather than restoring equilibrium, a crisis, or fall, instead 
demonstrated a consistent state of abstraction and derivation of value.  
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McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell’s act certainly revealed what was ‘real’ in another 
sense. By literalising circulation and taking on extreme risk, 
McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell performed circulation as a social relation, embedded in 
class hierarchy. For who would take such a risk? From what little can be gathered about 
McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell, we can ascertain that he was probably a first or 
second-generation Irish immigrant, who occupied a precarious enough social and 
financial position for the job to be worth it.  
 
Russo’s account of stigmatisation evokes Martin’s description of the way in which 
financialized cultures divide populations into ‘those able to avail themselves of wealth 
opportunities through risk taking and those who are considered ‘at risk.’’76 Risk in the 
present, Martin argued, has come to serve a ‘moral function’ by distinguishing between 
those with the capacity to embrace risk from ‘those relegated to being bad risks.’77 In 
late nineteenth-century New York, a moral, individually situated conception of risk was 
frequently employed, but the commentary surrounding 
McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell’s performance indicates that this view was becoming 
increasingly inadequate in the new era of corporate industrial capitalism. In spite of the 
Company holding McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell solely responsible for his actions, 
discussions concerning electricity and futures demonstrate that many were alive to the 
fact that more and faster circulation with increased connectivity and attendant risk was 
the direction of travel — was in fact necessary to the running of that pillar of 
modernity, the Stock Exchange. Such conditions required new conceptions of how risk 
could be understood and managed as a collective. They also spawned fantasies of 
autonomous, individual risk-takers, who could relieve everybody of collective 
precarity.  
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The recognition of stunts as a form in the late nineteenth century perhaps reflects new 
understandings of how risk and value related to one another, and how affective 
economies intersected with financial ones (through advertising for example). To a 
greater extent than ‘circus’, the word ‘stunt’ denotes anxiety regarding the extent to 
which an act and the value it creates is ‘real’. This makes stunts particularly vivid 
examples of conflicts between conceptions of derived value and derived reality, and 
an opposing view put forward by Martin, who argues that dance’s creation of value 
demonstrates a need to reject a ‘nefarious dichotomy between the real and the fictitious’ 
and move beyond it.78 While stunts such as McDonald/Donahue/McDonnell’s 
demonstrated the extent to which bodies and identities could be abstracted, they also 
retained the complexity and ambiguity of embodied, performed action, in which the 
fictitious and the real were near impossible to prise apart. It is this twin pull of stunt 
performances — their simultaneous invocation of reality, and rejection of it — which 
makes stunts and high finance worthy of comparison, and stunts prime examples of 
value abstractions in embodied motion. 
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